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In November 2018, to mark the 550th anniversary year of Guru Nanak’s birth, the governments 
of India and Pakistan agreed to develop the Kartarpur corridor over the river Ravi linking Sikhs’ 
two holiest shrines. The initiative is an important symbolic moment in the access to Sikh sacred 
spaces in Pakistan. This paper examines critically the efforts to control and manage this access 
since 1947. It assesses the regimes of regulation established by the two states to control access 
and reflects on the prospects for the Kartarpur corridor to become a ‘bridge of peace’. The Sikh 
case, the paper argues, offers an unusual comparative case-study of closure of sacred spaces to 






The Control of Sacred Spaces: 




In November 2018, the governments of India and Pakistan agreed to open a corridor 
over the river Ravi linking two important Sikh shrines: Dera Baba Nanak (in India) with 
gurdwara Darbar Kartarpur Sahib (in Pakistan). A mere 6.3 kilometres and the river Ravi 
separate these structures that are closely associated with the life and times of Gurn Nanak, the 
founder of the tradition. But despite this distance the international border that was created in 
1947 between the new state of Pakistan and India, and the history of rivalry between the two 
nuclear-armed neighbours, has limited any serious initiatives to make more accessible sacred 
spaces in East and West Punjab. The political division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 
was, also in some measure, a spiritual division as the new states established complex systems 
of regulation to control the access of pilgrims from the two countries. Nowhere was this 
divide more keenly felt than in the Punjab in which the multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
tradition of the province was torn asunder by the creation of an arbitrary boundary drawn 
ostensibly along ‘religious’ lines. As the religious nationalisms of the Indian National 
Congress (hereafter the Congress), the Muslim League and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) 
clashed, some of the key sacred spaces which fell on the ‘wrong’ side of the boundary line, 
became the sites of alternative narratives that contested the logic of partition. 
 
 
In contrast to the study of the politics and history of the partition of India, which has 
witnessed major methodological and conceptual advances since the 1980s (Talbot and Singh 
2008, ch.1), its religious consequences have been largely overlooked. This paper critically 
explores this neglected dimension by locating the debate in the comparative literature on the 
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control of sacred spaces. It then assesses the Sikh case-study through three temporal 
moments. First, the status of Nankana Sahib, the birth place of Guru Nanak, in the final phase 
of the transfer of power and how, in the months leading up to 15th August, 1947, Nankana 
Sahib became the source of a bitter dispute between the British government and colonial state 
and the Sikh leadership. Second, it evaluates how after 1947 both the governments of India 
and Pakistan have sought to regulate access by Sikh pilgrims to Nankana Sahib and other 
scared sites. Third, the paper reviews the prospects for a more open access to these sites for 
Sikhs in Pakistan suggested by the opening of the Kartarpur corridor. In conclusion, it reflects 
on the importance of the Sikh case-study for its wider implications for debates about the 







The literature on the control of sacred spacesi falls into two broad categories (Hassner 
2003). Most common are contestations as a result of schisms, syncretism, and conquest and 
real estate disputes. Such examples include the conflict between Jews and Muslims over the 
Temple on the Mount and the Al-Asqa mosque, and in India, the bitter rivalry since the early 
1980s between Hindus and Muslims over the control of the Bari Masjid mosque. These 
disputes raise the issue of ‘indivisibility’, of zero-sum contestations over rival claims to 
exclusive ownership of scared spaces (Ibid., 8). But not unrelated, and equally significant, is 
the more generic political control closely associated with the nature of church-state relations 
framed by secularism, nationalism and development which define the ideological limits of the 
religious (Casanova 1994). In the case of the Sikhs,  whose sacred spaces were divided in 
their homeland, the former category is largely irrelevant, but the latter is much more 
noteworthy in defining their relationship with the state in India and Pakistan, and as the 
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mainspring of the Congress’s and Muslim League’s nationalisms that prescribes the 
relationship with religious minorities. Accordingly, the term ‘control’ in this paper is used in 
two senses: as form of physical control of borders, security and institutions; and as an 
ideological resource to regulate, discipline and naturalise post-1947 nation- and state- 
formation. The state in Pakistan is generally viewed as exercising physical control over Sikh 
sacred spaces whereas the state in India is commonly associated with a more laissez faire 
approach of a liberal democracy. However, the central argument of this paper is that such a 
distinction is one of degree not kind: both states seek to exercise control over Sikh sacred 
shrines as means of managing the Sikh community because its conception of religious and 
political sovereignty disrupts the narratives of nation formation that led to 1947 and after. 
 
 
Nankana Sahib and the Partition of Punjab 
 
On 20 February, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons announced that the 
British would leave India by June 1948, and that Louis Mountbatten would succeed Wavell 
as viceroy. This announcement was made against the rising tide of mass communal violence 
in India and the decision of the Muslim League to withdraw from the protracted constitution- 
making process stared by the Cabinet Mission Plan in May 1946 (Moore, 1983, 221). At this 
stage the Labour government’s intention was still to transfer power to a united India that 
would accommodate the competing claims of the Congress and the Muslim League. But 
following Mountbatten’s arrival in New Delhi in late March, he soon concluded the British 
were ‘sitting on the edge of a volcano’ that could erupt any time (Mountbatten 1947). At the 
epicentre of this tension was the Punjab. Here the Muslim League’s campaign to oust the 
inter-communal coalition Unionist government finally materialised on the 2rd   March, and 
was followed by communal rioting in Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore, Amritsar, Jullunder and 
Attock. As central Punjab became the ‘battle ground for Pakistan’ (Mansergh and Moon 
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1980, 926), the resort to direct action led to mass violence ‘organised with extreme savagery’, 
with the massacre of Sikhs and Hindus in Rawalpindi resulting in 5,000 casualties and 35,000 
refugees (Ibid., 962).  This violence impelled the Sikh political leadership and the Congress 
to call for the partition of Punjab. But it was a partition on their terms to be defined by 
cultural, religious and economic factors - not just the head count. If the Muslim League’s 
pursuit of Pakistan laid claim to the whole of the Punjab, then the Sikhs and the Congress 
would call for a resizing of the province which  in turn would turn Pakistan into an empty 
husk (Mansergh and Moon 1981, 456). In the protracted negotiations between Mountbatten, 
the Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership from the end of March and the 
beginning of June in 1947, the only plan for the transfer of power that the Congress and the 
Muslim League would agree to was a quick demission of power to the two dominions of 
India and Pakistan. The division of the Punjab and Bengal was the inevitable outcome of this 
decision. The 3rd of June Plan envisaged the transfer of power to the new states on 14 and the 




The agreement, which was aimed at arriving at a settlement between the Congress and 
the Muslim League, inevitably marginalised Sikh claims that cut across the principle of 
Muslim and non-Muslim ‘contiguous majority areas’. These claims were on based on 
religious, cultural, historical and economic factors in order to ensure the community’s 
integrity in face of the majority principle that threatened to divide it equally between India 
and Pakistan. As Baldev Singh, the defence minister in the Interim Government (1946-47), 
and the chief Sikh representative on the Viceroy’s Executive, was to lament: ‘Everything we 
have in this world is within the border of the Punjab. It is our homeland’ (Mansergh and 
Moon, 1981, 655). All strands of Sikh leadership - SAD, the Congress, the Princes, and 
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Baldev Singh himself - forthrightly conveyed to Mountbatten and his staff the imperative of 
keeping Nankana Sahib, which was in a Muslim majority district, within the territory to be 
allocated to India. At worst, Nankana Sahib’s special place in Sikhism merited the 
designation of a ‘free city’, controlled by no one, and open to all (Mansergh and Moon 1980, 
183-4). Indeed, the principles which underpinned the Sikh claims for Nankana Sahib, and 
other territories to be excluded from Pakistan, according to Baldev Singh, rested on the 
assurances given to the Sikhs by the British about the protection of the community. These 
included the need to disturb as little as possible its homogeneity and integrity, that the 
division was forced on Sikhs (and Hindus) by the Muslim League, and to avoid future 
conflict by excluding Muslim areas in areas of high Sikh populations (Mansergh and Moon, 
1981 476-69). It was, in essence, the application of the claim for Pakistan in reverse. 
Mountbatten noted, with some irony, that the Sikhs ‘want – on religious grounds like 
Muslims – to take over and dominate in areas in which they are a minority’ (Ibid., 470) 
 
 
The British government, in the words of the Secretary of State for India, sought ‘to 
keep the Sikhs quiet until the transfer of power’ (Mansergh and Moon 1981, 712) by the 
device of a Boundary Commission that was tasked with delineating the border between India 
and Pakistan. In undertaking its work the commission was required to take into account 
factors other than the simple majority/minority Muslim and non-Muslim areas. Both the 
Secretary of State for India and Mountbatten believed that the commission would provide a 
resolution to Sikhs claims. The Sikh leaders, in contrast, reluctantly acquiesced to the 3rd June 
Plan, which made no mention of the Sikh claims, and the terms of reference of the Boundary 
Commission,ii but they also made no secret of their intention to redraw the boundary if the 
outcome seriously impaired their interests (The Times of India, 5 June, 1947). 
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In the debate in the House of Commons on the India Independence Act on 14 July, 
1947, the Under Secretary of State for India, Arthur Henderson, sought to clarify the 
inclusion of ‘other factors’ in the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission. This 
addition he insisted had been made 
by the Prime Minister to enable the Commission to have regard to the special 
circumstances of the Sikh community in the Punjab where considerations such 
as location of their religious shrines can be reasonably taken into account up to 
a point (Hansard, 14 July, 1947). 
 
However, he was at pains to stress that it was ‘for the Commission itself to decide what are 
the other factors and how much importance should be attached to all or any of them’ (Ibid., 
emphasis added). But shortly after this statement, Henderson faced a written Parliamentary 
question on whether the consideration of ‘other factors’, including religion, applied only to 
Sikhs; and as such, whether minor local variations or substantial inroads into majority areas 
were contemplated. The response of the Secretary of State for India, Henderson’s superior, 
was to quickly backtrack from this concession: religious shrines of other communities, he 
asserted, would receive equal treatment if the Boundary Commission so decided (Mansregh 
and Moon 1983, 329). 
 
 
The Sikh leadership’s response to these manoeuvres was to organise, mobilise, lobby 
and argue the community’s case before the Punjab Boundary Commission. After the riots in 
March, militias were established and arms collected for direct action in the event of the 
boundary award being unfavourable to the community’s claims. Some have suggested that 
this amounted to a substantive conspiracy that envisaged the extensive sabotage of Sikh 
settlements in West Punjab, the assassination of Jinnah, and the involvement of Sikh princely 
states in the creation of Khalistan comprising the Lahore division (Mansergh and Moon 1983, 
537-8).The precise nature of this conspiracy remains highly contested,  but in the weeks 
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before the award the armed militias were very much in action in ethnically cleansing East 
Punjab of its Muslim population (Brass 2003). 
 
 
Against the rising tide of communal violence, protests and conferences were 
organised to air the community’s grievances. During the province-wide protest on 8 July to 
mark ‘Nankana Sahib Day’, the Reuter’s Indian service reported that India’s 5.7 million 
Sikhs ‘wore arm bands at the British plans to split their community’. Gurdwara congregations 
throughout Punjab approved a resolution declaring that ‘any partition that did not secure the 
integrity and solidarity of the Sikh community would be unacceptable and create a difficult 
situation’. Sikh leaders openly proclaimed that there would be no peace in the Punjab ‘if the 
Sikhs were dissatisfied with the partition’ (Mansergh and Moon 1983, 17-8). Baldev Singh, at 
a gathering in Delhi gurdwara, exhorted his congregation to ‘make all sacrifices if the verdict 
of the Boundary Commission goes against them’ (Ibid., 18) A day after this protest, Giani 
Kartar Singh, the head of SAD, in a meeting with Governor of Punjab, issued what the latter 
described as the nearest thing to a Sikh ultimatum: 
that they [the Sikhs] must have one canal system; they must have Nankana Sahib; 
finally, the arrangements must be such as to bring three-quarters or at least third of the 
Sikh population into East Punjab… The Giani asserted that unless it was recognised 
by HMG, the viceroy and the party leaders that the fate of the Sikhs was a vital issue 




To coincide with the sittings of the Punjab Boundary Commission, the Sikh 
leadership also decided to hold a major conference at Nankana Sahib on 27 July to demand 
its inclusion in East Punjab. Fearing widespread disorder, Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of 
Punjab, declared the gathering illegal, imposing a strict clamp down on the travel to and from 
the gurdwara from all areas of the province. A security cordon was established around the 
city of Nankana Sahib and the surrounding districts by the police and armed troops. Aircrafts 
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dropped leaflets on Sikh areas discouraging them from sending jathas (armed bands) towards 
Nankana Sahib. In spite of these measure, and open firing on the crowds by the troops, 
several thousand Sikhs were able to gather for the conference and pass anti-Pakistan 
resolutions (Ibid., 309-10). The gathering dispersed the following day, but not before the 
troops had caused confusion and mayhem. The incident was raised at the Viceroy’s Staff 
Meeting the same day, with Mountbatten questioning the Governor’s wisdom in imposing a 
ban. Recognising that the issue of Nankana Sahib would continue to evoke a strong feeling 
among Sikhs, one constitutional advisor at the meeting suggested the city be given a Vatican- 
like status.  Again however decisive executive support for the proposal was not forthcoming: 
it was decided only to raise the issue with the Chairman of the Boundary Commission who 
could forward this suggestion to the Muslim League, and there appears to be no evidence that 
the matter was followed through (Ibid., 337). 
 
 
A day before the Nankana Sahib conference, Giani Kartar Singh sent to the private 
secretary of Mountbatten a small pamphlet outlining the case for the inclusion of the Nankana 
Sahib tract in India. He drew attention to the importance of Nankana Sahib as one of Sikhs’ 
most important spiritual centres. ‘This place’, he concluded, is ‘the holiest of the holy and 
comparable in sanctity only to the Mecca of the Muslims in the Arabian peninsula.’ It had a 
flourishing community and an estate of 17,000 acres to support it provided by Maharaja 
Ranjit Singh. To leave it in Pakistan ‘would be like insulting the heart against the body’ 
(Singh 1991, 294). 
 
 
In the memorandum presented to the Punjab Boundary Commission, Justice Harnam 
Singh outlined in detail the religious, economic and geographic ‘other factors’ for 
consideration of the Sikh community’s case.  The principal gurdwaras associated with the life 
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and time of the Gurus, he insisted - Janam Asthan Nankana Sahib, Dera Sahib, Darbar Sahib 
Kartarpur, and Gurdwaras Chomala and Chhevin Padsha - were in West Punjab. Lahore itself 
was popularly referred to as ‘the Guru’s cradle’ (Ibid., 252). But these were no ordinary 
shrines of saints and religious leaders as the Muslim League’s submission alleged. Rather, as 
Justice Teja Singh subsequently made clear in his report to the Boundary Commission 
The gurdwaras, the situation of which is sought to be used as factor in the 
demarcation of the boundaries, are those places of worship which were either 
founded by the ten Gurus or were established long ago to commemorate 
particular incidents that happened during their lives and with which they are 
connected…Now, to the Sikhs the ten Gurus are what Christ is to Christians, 
Hazrat Mohammad is to Muslims and the principal gods who are believed to 
be the incarnation of Vishnu are to Hindus…It is a mistake to put them on the 
same footing as the religious places founded by or associated with saints or 
other religious men howeverso prominent or respected they might be. There 
are hundreds of gurdwaras that were established by Sikh saints or which were 
built in the memory of Sikh martyrs but none of them enjoys the sacred 
character that [is] reserved for the class mentioned above, and the only shrines 
of the Muslims that in respect of sacredness and importance can compare with 
the gurdwaras of that class are the shrines that stand in Mecca and Medina 
(Ibid., 358). 
 
The Sikhs, Teja Singh argued, were not laying claim to territories associated with all these 
gurdwaras, but principle ones like Nankana Sahib which defined their ‘homeland’ and ‘holy 
land’. As he summarised: 
Therefore I submit that when you are considering this question [of boundaries] 
the special features of the Sikh community should be taken into account…for 
the Sikhs, the city of Amritsar, the city of Nankana Sahib in [the] Sheikhupura 
district, the city of Kartarpur in Shahargarh tehsil [the] Gurdaspur district, are 
the Mecca and Medina and their Hardwar and Benares (Ahmed 133). 
 
 
Finally, in the run-up to boundary award, there was flurry of activity to lobby 
Mountbatten, HMG in London, and the Punjab administration. On the 7 August, the 
Maharaja of Patiala wrote to Mountbatten that on Nankana Sahib ‘Sikh sentiment about this 
is so strong it would be dangerous to minimise it, as under no circumstances can they [the 
Sikhs] be persuaded to allow this to go into foreign territory’ (Mansergh and Moon 1983, 
564). In early August, Principal Ganga Singh and Meherban Singh Dhupia were sent to 
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London to meet the Secretary of State of India before the Boundary Commission announced 
the award. Attlee refused to see them. The Secretary of State for India rebuffed them by 
noting that the ‘matter was out of his hands’, and he was only prepared to meet ‘such 
distinguished representatives of the great Sikh community … [to] make their acquaintance’ 
(Ibid., 621). Major Short, who was the main interlocutor between the Viceroy’s staff and the 
Sikh leadership, was impressed upon to convey Sikh concerns. Responding to apprehension 
within Mountbatten’s staff that Sikhs were likely to cause trouble if the award went again 
them, Short counselled that if Nankana Sahib were accorded the status of ‘Vatican 
municipality of some sort and free entry and visit’, Sikh resentment could be assuaged 
because ‘their hearts [would] thus be touched, [and] their heads will be cooled’ (Singh 1991, 
468). Earlier, Giani Kartar Singh in meeting with the Punjab Governor had all but repudiated 
the understanding that the Sikhs would accept the Boundary Commission’s report. Querying 
the authority of Baldev Singh to accept the outcome without wider consultations within the 
community, he warned that the Sikhs would not take the outcome ‘lying down’ and retained 
the right by using direct action to revise any unfavourable outcome. At the end of his 
meeting, according to Jenkins, Giani Kartar Singh ‘burst into tears’ and implored him to help 
the community (Mansergh and Moon 1983, 429-31.) Jenkins, who was viewed by the Muslim 
League as pro-Sikh, and had regularly been warning New Delhi of the impending war of 
communal succession, reassured Giani Kartar Singh that he saw no reason why Sikh access  
to Nankana Sahib would not continue after August 14/15, but added as an aside that the Sikhs 
would ‘have to accept the award and have to come into line if the two dominions [of India 
and Pakistan] were to enforce it’ (Ibid., 430). Jenkins however could not conceal his disdain 
for the Sikh leadership who he believed had ‘made a great mess of the whole Sikh question’. 
‘The real solution’, according to him, ‘was to get rid of the non-Punjabi-speaking districts 
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and to keep the rest of the Punjab in Pakistan. I think the Sikhs appreciate this now; but it is 
too late to do anything about it’ (Ibid., 430). 
 
 
In the event, the ‘other factors’ on which the Sikh case so vitally depended, played a 
minimal role in delimitation of the new international boundary in the Punjab. The Punjab 
Boundary Commission failed to provide an agreed report, leaving Sir Cyril Radcliffe to make 
the final determination which, with minor adjustments of territory, followed closely the 
principle of Muslim and non-Muslim ‘contiguous majority areas’. The award was scheduled 
to be made before the independence of Pakistan (14 August) and India (15 August), but was 
deliberately delayed lest its consequences reflected poorly on the Raj (Ibid., 760). And 
despite the official commitment which Mountbatten was able to extract from Jinnah, Nehru, 
Patel and Baldev Singh regarding the rights and safety of religious minorities in India and 
Pakistan, the reality after the 15 August was mass violence in which millions of people in 
Punjab became refugees. The intensity of this violence was most acute in East Punjab 
because the Sikh leadership organised the systematic ethnic cleansing of Muslims to 
compensate territories forgone on West Punjab (Singh 2013). For Sikhs, an international 
boundary across their ‘homeland’ and ‘holy land’  would create a deep sense of  spiritual 
loss, a longing that was eventually inscribed into the daily ardas (supplications), which 
pleads for these shrines to be eventually united with the panth (the Sikh community) in free 
and unhindered access (Singh and Fair 2000, 256). But after 1947, without the impartial role 
of the colonial state, access to sacred spaces such as Nankana Sahib would be determined by 
official policies of India and Pakistan. 
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Access to Sikh sacred spaces in Pakistan post-1947 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that for individuals the partition was a long, drawn-out 
process which continued to have implications for refuges for several decades afterwards 
(Zamindar 2007). For collective groups, on the other hand, the states of India and Pakistan 
quickly establish new regulatory regimes in which the construction of new national identities 
rooted in the pre-1947 anti-colonial discourses shaped by the antagonisms between the 
Congress and the Muslim League played a central role. These differences would eventually 
crystallise in the armed rivalry that would lead to four wars, the nuclearisation of South Asia, 
and with Kashmir as the enduring symbol of the divide. Equally important were the efforts to 
regulate access to, and the religious shrines of, minority religious communities in the new 
states which become a barometer of Indo-Pakistan relations. For religious minorities like the 




Since the early 1950s, the formal management of evacuee shrines and pilgrim visits 
by citizens of India and Pakistan to each other’s countries are regulated by treaties and 
protocols. The Liaquat-Nehru Pact (1950), agreed after of exodus of Hindus from East 
Pakistan in 1950, was a bilateral treaty which offered protection to minority rights and gave 
the right to refugees to return and dispose of their property (India Treaty Series 1950). 
Although the text of the treaty refers primarily to East Pakistan, for the Shiromani Gurdwara 
Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) it justifies its claims to manage gurdwaras in Pakistan (Rana 
2014). This understanding appears to have been compromised by a secret agreement between 
India’s Minister for Home Affairs, Govind Ballabh Pant and Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Sikandar Mirza in 1955, to treat Sikh shrines and property attached to them, including 
Nankana Sahib, as ‘evacuee property’ to be disposed of as ordinary holdings (Lal 2014) . 
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Following the creation of Bangladesh, the Shimla Agreement (1972) committed India and 
Pakistan to open trade and communications and promote ‘travel facilities for the nationals of 
the other country’ (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.(a)) The agreement was accompanied by 
the Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines (1974) which approved such visits ‘without 
discrimination to religion or sect’ to a designated list of shrines (18), limiting to a maximum 
of 20 parties per year from each country, though the numbers of each party can vary. The 
protocol also required that every ‘effort should continue to be made to ensure that places of 
religious worship mentioned in the agreed list are properly maintained and their sanctity 
preserved’ (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d. (b)). For Sikh pilgrims in India, such visits are 
limited to the birth anniversary of Guru Nanak and vaisakhi, the martyrdom of Guru Arjan 
and the birth anniversary of Maharaj Ranjit Singh, though the range and number of visits 
seems to have expanded greatly since (Sikhsangat 2011). In 1999, partially in response to the 
concerns raised by the Sikh diaspora about the conditions of Sikh gurdwaras in Pakistan, the 
government of Pakistan formed the Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee 
(PSGPK) to oversee the work Evacuee Trust Property Board which is formally entrusted with 
managing Sikh shrines (Khalid 2018, 18); and despite heightened hostility between India and 
Pakistan after 9/11 and the terrorist attack on the India parliament (2001), which led to a 
general mobilisation between the two countries, in the ensuing détente  several initiatives 
were taken to improve East/West Punjab dialogue, including preliminary efforts to open up 
the Kartarpur corridor and a bus service from Amritsar to Nankana Sahib (2006) (Talbot 
2010). But these symbolic measures have struggled to overcome bureaucratic, security and 
diplomatic hurdles. The bus service, for instance, was heavily curtailed following the terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai (2008); it has struggled in recent years to secure enough passengers to 
make the journey economic viable (Bassi 2017). In the heightened state of tension between 
India and Pakistan following the turmoil in Kashmir and the ‘surgical strike’ across the Line 
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of Control (September 2016), pilgrims have once again been limited to ‘special trains’ as the 
preferred mode of transportation. 
 
 
However, these regimes of control have been increasingly subverted by the 
emergence of a Sikh diaspora (Tatla 1999). In the mid-1970s, Ganga Singh Dhillon, a 
Washington-based businessman, with extensive networks in the US political establishment, 
created the Nankana Sahib Foundation (1974) for the preservation and maintenance of Sikh 
sacred shrines in Pakistan. The objective was to establish an international organisation run by 
Sikhs to manage these institutions. Dhillon formed a close friendship with Pakistan’s military 
leader President Zia-ul-Haq, a refugee from East Punjab, who recognised the importance of 
providing free access to, and freedom of worship, at these shrines in shaping Sikh sentiment 
in India and the diaspora (Badhwar 1981). Following the entry of the Indian army into the 
Golden Temple in June 1984, the Government of India in its White Paper attributed the 
militant violence in Punjab to the material and political support provided by Pakistan 
(Government of India, 1984); and in the decade long insurgency that ensued thereafter, 
Pakistan was accused not only of supporting the militants but also of manipulating Sikh 
religious sentiment in fostering Sikh religious separatism. Such encouragement, according to 
Talbot (2010, 70.73), coincided with the latter’s strategic objective of ‘opening another 
“front” in its covert conflict with India’. 
 
 
After 1984 most of the leading Sikh militant groups were based in Pakistan. They 
were supported discretely by the Pakistan intelligence agencies but kept at arm’s length from 
the major Sikh shrines that were the subject of agreement between India and Pakistan. 
Nonetheless, as the human rights violations and counter-insurgency efforts of the Indian state 
intensified, especially from the mid-1980s to the 1990s (Pettigrew 1995), annual religious 
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events became occasions for the mobilisation by the Sikh diaspora. Indian diplomats 
regularly complained to Pakistani officials that scared sites such as Nankana Sahib were 
being used for the promotion of Sikh separatist activities and anti-Indian propaganda (The 
Times of India, July 3, 1997). 
 
 
Since the 1990s, Sikh shrines in Pakistan have become sites of major organised 
pilgrim tours. This change is in part reflective of the broader trends in global tourism in 
which sacred spaces have become the destinations of mass pilgrimage in the age of 
globalisation and cheap tourism (Timothy and Olson 2006). It is also the result of sustained 
private initiatives by local sants (religious leaders) who command sizable congregations, and 
have started the process of leading the faithful to rediscover a lost heritage (Tatla 1992) 
Gurdwaras, community groups and families in the diaspora regularly organise such tours to 
leading shrines on key dates in the Sikh calendar. These tours are publicly advertise in the 
Punjabi media, and travel agencies based in Pakistan catering for the growing Sikh pilgrim 
market have proliferated, offering bespoke tours to more general accommodation of large 
parties.iii   This market is likely to expand rapidly as Pakistan has further liberalised travel 
from the Sikh diaspora with facilities for visa on arrival, by actively promoting its cultural 
‘soft power’, and encouraging new interest in Sikh cultural and religious inheritance in 
Pakistan reflected in such publications as Singh’s Lost Heritage: The Sikh Legacy in Pakistan 
(2016) and Khalid’s Walking with Nanak (2018). The prospects of large-scale pilgrimage to 
Pakistan, which now is being portrayed as the ‘religious home’ of the Sikhs, is likely to be 
welcomed by the diaspora, and Sikhs in East Punjab. It also however has the potential to raise 
some unsettling questions about the current regimes for access to, and management of, Sikh 
religious shrines and create new imaginaries of Sikh ‘holy land’ and ‘home land’. 
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The Kartarpur Corridor 
 
It is against this broad historical background that current decision of the Pakistan 
government, and India’s positive response to it, needs to be understood. Officially, the 
initiative ‘is in line with Islamic principles that advocate respect for all religions and 
Pakistan’s policy of promoting interfaith harmony and religious tolerance’ (Yousaf 2019). 
 
 
Realistically, however it is driven by the need for a rapprochement with India following the 
spike in terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir since 2014, and Pakistan’s increasing 
domestic financial difficulties. Similarly, India’s begrudging engagement with the process, 
has been influenced largely by the potential impact on Sikh voters in the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections in Punjab (Sevea 2018). But these short-term considerations apart, 
the strategic imperatives for both states remain the same: to manage, regulate and control 
access to Sikh scared shrines the existence of which radically disrupts the new sacred 
geographies of post-1947 Indian and Pakistani nationalisms. 
 
 
Unconventionally, the current move to open the Kartarpur corridor was instigated by 
the maverick ex-cricketer turned politician, Navtej Singh Sidhu, during his visit to Prime 
Minister Imran Khan’s inauguration on 18 August 2018. At the ceremony, Sidhu was assured 
by the Pakistan Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa that serious steps would be taken to 
open a corridor for the Kartarpur Sahib Gurdwara in Pakistan on the occasion of 550th birth 
anniversary of Guru Nanak’s birth. Sidhu, who was universally condemned for his visit in the 
Indian press for fraternising with the enemy, and hugging the Pakistan army chief while 
Indian soldiers were being killed in Kashmir, remained unrepentant, arguing against his party 
(Indian Express, 19 August, 2018). Weary that the initiative was passing to Pakistan, on 26 
November, 2018, amid confusion and chaos, Vice President Venkaiah Naidu and Captain 
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Amrinder Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab, laid the foundation stone of the Dera Baba Nanak- 
Kartarpur Shaib corridor (Dhaliwal 2018a). The sanctity of the occasion however was marred 
by the political rivalry between the BJP and the Congress as the former’s representative tried 
to appropriate the event against the all too public protests of the latter (Dhaliwal 2018b) 
 
 
In Pakistan, the ground-breaking ceremony at Kartarpur was attended by Imran Khan, 
the Pakistan Army Chief, dignitaries, and politicians and officials invited from India. In his 
speech Khan observed that the ‘happiness he saw on the faces of the Sikh pilgrims was like 
Muslims feel when they reach near Makkah or Medina’. While regretting the state of the 
current affairs between India and Pakistan, he called for a ‘civilised relationship’ between the 
two states, pleaded for a resolution of the ‘Kashmir problem’, and strong economic ties 
between the subcontinental neighbours, (The News, 28 November, 2018). Interestingly in 
moving this initiative Khan was adamant that his ‘government, his party, all political parties, 
the military and all Pakistani institutions were on the same page’ (Sevea, 4). In responding to 
Khan’s speech, Harsimrat Kaur Badal, a senior stalwart of the SAD, and a Union Cabinet 
Minister, declared that ‘This is a historic day for our [Sikh] nation. Desires of millions of Sikhs 
around the world have been fulfilled today.’ She concluded by labelling the initiative as ‘peace 




Since the ceremonies the process of creating the corridor has become ensnared in all too 
familiar hurdles. In India, the Chief Minister in Punjab has vented his frustration at the reluctance 
of the Centre to sanction the necessary funds for development to start the construction of the 
infrastructure for the corridor. Vocal voices in the press, too, have raised security concerns about 
the development, with some sections openly hostile, citing the legacy of Sikh militancy and the 
on-going insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (Davar 2019). In Pakistan, no formal opposition has 
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been expressed against the initiative, but the process of building the corridor appears to be 
reinventing the old security structures which militate against the free movement of pilgrims. In a 
59-page document submitted to the Indian officials at the end of December 2018, Pakistan’s 
officials made 14 recommendations which included: the construction of facilitation and security 
centres on both sides of the corridor; group visits by pilgrims with a minimum of 15 persons per 
groups; a maximum of 500 visitors a day; a special permit to be issued to visitors by the 
Government of Pakistan; the list of visitors to be communicated to Pakistan three days in advance 
of any visit; all visitors to carry an Indian passport; and all visitors would be required to obtain a 
security clearance certificate from Indian authorities (The Tribune,  30 December, 2018). 
Surprisingly, no mention has been made of reciprocal travel arrangements on the Indian side if 
Sikhs – and, indeed non-Sikhs based in Pakistan - wish to visit Dera Baba Nanak. 
 
 
For Capt. Amrinder Singh these impediments run counter to the promise of khula 
darshan (open access) of Darbar Kartarpur Sahib for all. The idea of ‘hassle free travel’, 
which is central to connecting the two shrines, according to him, is being gradually 
undermined at the behest of BJP’s communally-minded politicians like Vijay Sampla, the 
Minister for State and Social Justice, who he alleged is actively aiming to ‘scuttle [the] Sikh 
community’s Kartarpur dream’ by insisting that a passport and a visa be mandatory 
requirements for pilgrims. Sampla’s outlook, Capt.Amrinder Singh insisted, ‘was reflective 
of the BJP’s anti-minority attitude and the Modi government’s continued attempts to side-line 
the country’s minorities to further its politically motivated agenda’ (Rozana Spokesman, 17 
January, 2019). Instead of the central governments coordinating and managing these 
processes, many of the practical issues could be readily resolved by better coordination 
between the two Punjab authorities. He has also warned the central government against 
unnecessary procrastination and delay because such action ‘would cause untold 
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disappointment to the Sikh community based in India as [well] as all over the world’ 
(Business Standard, 17 January, 2019). 
 
 
Capt. Amrinder Singh’s concerns, of course, might well be typical of political rhetoric 
by a seasoned politician because the two countries are at the beginning of a process of 
negotiation and bargaining in constructing permanent structures, including a walkway bridge 
over the Ravi. It is inevitable therefore that there are likely to strong disagreements that might 
be further compounded by the tight time-frame agreed by both sides to open the corridor by 
November 2019. But, perhaps more importantly, overshadowing the initiative, as previous 
episodes of India-Pakistan détente have illustrated, is the spectre of unexpected political 
developments - the impending national elections in India, a sudden changes in the polity in 
Pakistan, and terrorist incidents in India, such as the Palwama attack (February 2019) which 
has led to the recent confrontation between the two countries - that might derail the project. 




Yet these realities belie how the Karartpur corridor process is being managed by the 
two states to assert political sovereignty over access to Sikh sacred spaces. Ostensibly, these 
claims of sovereignty are evident in the requirement of visas, passports and security clearance 
- against the desire of the regional Sikh population for open travel. Lurking behind these 
formalities are the traditional fears of unintended consequences for the 1947 settlement if 
access to Sikh shrines, and indeed, travel across the borderline, becomes unregulated, or can 
no longer be managed by India and Pakistan. While the parallels with Eastern European 
states just before the collapse of the Berlin Wall are probably unwarranted, the post-1947 
political elites in India and Pakistan have sedulously avoided unfettered movement across the 
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border line, either in Punjab or Kashmir. The promise of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to create borderless travel in South Asia has remained 
largely unfulfilled. Thus, whatever the local arrangements are made to make access less 
burdensome, national governments will maintain the regimes of control of access that they 
have so heavily invested in since independence. 
 
 
Moreover, the discourses used by the leaders of India and Pakistan in launching the 
initiative reinforce the conventional narratives of nationhood that led to 1947. For Pakistan, 
the measure is entirely consistent with its self-image as an ‘Islamic republic’ promoting inter- 
religious harmony and protecting the rights of religious minorities. An official press note also 
added, somewhat facetiously, probably as an afterthought, that the proposal was in line ‘line 
with Quadi’s (Jinnah’s) vision of a peaceful neighbourhood’ (Daily Messenger, 22 January, 
2019). But as Talbot (2010, 73) has pointed out, the Pakistan state is much more inclined to 
deal with religious categories than ethnic ones because ‘the emphasis on access to sacred 
spaces, rather than on, for example, improving cultural exchange’, means that ‘Punjabi ethno- 
nationalists [can] continue to be marginalised in the region that forms the core component of 
the Pakistan state’. Designating Sikh issues as religious one, and one essentially of access to 
sacred spaces controlled and managed by the Pakistan state, denudes them of their shared 




Likewise, the Indian state’s understanding of the initiative, with its emphasis on Sikhs 
as individual citizens who practice religion within the private realm - not as a corporate 
religio-political community - is entirely consistent with the post-1947 construction of 
religious minorities as communities of culture, without any claims on public space or 
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institutions (Kim 2019). But while minority religious communities like the Christians, 
Muslims and Sikhs have been politically disarmed, the Congress and the Bhartiya Janata 
Party (BJP) have actively promoted Hinduism as form of secularised majoritarianism, an 
ideal type of civic religion (Embree 1990). This structural imbalance in the nature of Indian 
state secularism has created a context in which political representatives of religious minorities 
have to frame their demands in the idiom of the dominant discourses of majoritarianism. 
Hence the objections of Capt. Amrinder Singh, a Congress politician, to Pakistan’s initial 
proposal to limit access to Sikhs only. Hence, too,  his rather curious explanation why such 
an exclusive interpretation of Sikh identity by the Pakistan state would be deemed offensive 
to many Hindus – not necessarily other religions – who have historically viewed Sikhism 
within the broader Hindu tradition (National Herald, 23 January, 2019). While Arminder 
Singh’s views reflect the assimilations strands of modern Hindu nationalism, its more overt 
manifestations are evident in Sampla’s efforts to ‘scuttle’ the initiative by creating 
unnecessary hurdles and BJP orchestrated attempts to control leading Sikh shrines. This new 




The Kartarpur corridor has also begun to reveal the underlying anxieties of 
governments in India and Pakistan in how to manage the ‘Sikh question’, a question which 
was the main cause of the division of the province in 1947 and its bloody aftermath. For 
governments in Pakistan, Sikhs and Sikh issues remain an instrumental object. The narrative 
of Sikh community as an ‘asset’ is so deeply embedded in the official historiography of 
Pakistan which, incidentally, regularly portrays the Sikh leadership as beguiled led by the 
Congress into demanding the division of the province in 1947 (Talbot 2010; Mirza, Hasnat, 
and Mahmood 1985; Hussain 1984), that it is difficult to envisage how it can be readily 
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revised to offer a more open, welcoming vision of nationhood in which minorities are 
tolerated and celebrated. The corridor might be the beginnings of such a process; history 
cautions us against such an optimistic reading, however. 
 
 
Similar anxieties are evident in how governments in India have framed policies on 
Sikhs and Sikh issues. The rhetoric that the corridor could ‘become a symbol of love and 
peace between the two countries’ (Hindustantimes, 26 November, 2018)), co-exists uneasily 
with profound misgivings about militant Sikh terrorism, Pakistan’s design, and the loyalty of 
a community that is traditionally viewed as sentinels on the border (Pandy 2019). The 
literature on the counterinsurgency in Punjab between 1984 and 1993, for example, is 
dominated by discourses of how Sikhs were prone to emotional manipulation by Pakistan, 
denying the community or its individuals any sense of agency over its own affairs (Dhillon 
2006). Even after1947, unsubtle attempts were made by the Congress to communalise the 
Punjabi Suba movement, conceding the linguistic reorganisation of the province only as a 
matter of ‘principle’ following the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. As a non-Hindu majority, 
peripheral border state, ethnic conflict in Punjab has been by managed by ‘hegemonic 
control’; and when this has broken down, as was the case after 1984, it has been replaced by 
‘violent control’ (Singh 2000, 47). More recently, with the rise of Hindu nationalism as the 
governing ideology of the state, efforts have been made to assimilate the Sikh tradition within 
the pantheon of Hinduism. Whereas the BJP and its Sangh parivar (family of organisations of 
the Hindu Right) have embarked on a strategy of culturally and politically excluding 
Christian and Muslim minorities, Indic religious minorities, such as Buddhist, Jains and 
Sikhs, have been subject to integrationist and assimilative pressures (Kim 2017). Since the 
formation of BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government in 2014, institutions of 
religious minorities, including educational institutions, have been subject to strict regulatory 
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controls and infiltration by Hindutva ideologues who have systematically undermined their 
independence and autonomy. And in the making of what Baru (2013) has called the ‘Second 
Indian republic’, in which Hindu nationalism is firmly displacing Nehruvian secularism as 
the governing ideology, the religious terms of trade between Hinduism and Sikhism are now 
firmly in the former’s favour (Singh and Shani 2020). Whether in the medium term Sikh 
religious or political autonomy will survive, or might become part of new imaginings, that 







In the comparative analysis of control of sacred spaces, the Sikh case-study offer an unusual 
example that defies clear classification. It is not a struggle for ‘indivisibility’ against another 
faith tradition or sect for sole ownership of sacred spaces. Nor does it resemble the case of 
settler and colonial societies where sacred spaces were reassigned new functions by post- 
colonial states or indigenous societies. Nor, still, does it have parallels in the consequences 
which followed the creation of modern authoritarian political systems or the establishment of 
Communist regimes post-1945, either in Eastern Europe or developing states in the South, 
where religious practices, especially of minorities, were proscribed. Rather, for Sikhs, 
including those in the diaspora, access to leading religious shrines of the community has been 
denied to them since 1947 in what has traditionally been viewed as their ‘homeland’ and 
‘holy land’. Because this ‘homeland’ was an integral part of the Congress and Muslim 
League’s drive for nation statehood, both before and after 1947, the division of the Punjab, 
with the simultaneous division of the Sikh community, and its sacred spaces, was deemed as 
the necessary consequence of India’s decolonisation by the three principal parties to the 
process – the British government, the Congress and the Muslim League. This unspoken 
25  
assumption was made palatable by the device of the Boundary Commission; its consequences 
were the cataclysmic outcomes of the Commission’s award. 
 
 
The Sikh leaders’ opposition to the division of the Punjab was rooted in the 
community’s spiritual, economic and cultural heritage within the province that did not 
conform to the principle of Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. At the heart of this 
opposition was the prospect of inclusion of leading gurdwaras, like Nankana Sahib, in the 
new state of Pakistan. These sacred spaces had been critical in the development of a modern 
Sikh identity in which Sikhs had reimagined themselves as a religiously and politically 
sovereign, with the SAD and the SGPC emerging as the institutional elements of the ‘Sikh 
political system’ (Singh and Shani, ch.2; Fox 1985; Oberoi 1994). But because this idea of 
religious and sovereignty offered a radically different vision of post-colonial Punjab, and 
indeed India, than contemplated by either the Congress or the Muslim League, it was not 
seriously entertained by the British who viewed the Sikhs as a ‘nuisance’.iv 
 
 
Since 1947, the partition has become the national foundational myth of India and 
Pakistan (Talbot and Singh, 130-1). In the case of the former, it has led to the creation of a 
highly centralised secular state in which religious minorities have been de-politicised; in the 
latter, the failure of democratisation has produced long period of military rule with the 
Islamciation of the state. Ironically, despite these prima facie differences, both states have 
followed remarkably similar policies in managing Sikh issues: whereas in Pakistan the 
creation of the international border has enabled the state to control and regulate access of 
Sikhs to sacred spaces in West Punjab, in India, Sikhs’ religious and political freedoms have 
been heavily circumscribed, culminating in the army’s entry into the Golden Temple. Not 
unnaturally, therefore, the regimes for managing Sikh sacred spaces in both East and West 
26  
Punjab are characterised by a high degree of political sensitivities in efforts to control, define 
and regulate access to, and functions of, Sikh scared spaces. 
 
 
The opening of the Kartarpur corridor offers a beacon of hope in otherwise a conflict- 
torn Indo-Pakistan relationship. But this initiative needs to be situated in its appropriate 
historical context: namely, that neither state’s approach marks a new departure from the logic 
of partition as a necessary evil. For Sikhs, unfettered access to the community’s sacred and 
cultural spaces in their ‘homeland’ and ‘holy land’ is unlikely to overcome the considerable 
barriers created by Indian and Pakistani nation-statehood anytime soon. Thus, the Kartarpur 
corridor might well become a ‘bridge of peace’ between India and Pakistan; it is also 
however likely to remain ‘a bridge too far’ for the Sikh community because that which is near 
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i Sacred spaces, according to Hassner (2003, 5), are characterised by three functions: ‘they are places of 
communication with divinity through prayer, movement or visual contact with images of the divine; they are 
places of divine presence, often promising healing, success or salvation, and they provide meaning to the 
faithful for metaphorically reflecting the underlying order of the world’. To be recognised as such these places 
need to have centrality and exclusivity for the faithful. The major Sikh gurdwaras in West Punjab associated 
with the gurus, as we shall see, fulfil the definition of sacred spaces and the criterions of centrality and 
exclusivity. For clarity we use the terms sacred spaces, shrines and gurdwaras as they pertain to the Sikh 
community’s case interchangeably, though were recognise the conceptual and institutional differences among 
them. 
ii The terms of reference of the Boundary Commission were agreed by the leaders of the Congress, Muslim 
League and the Sikhs. Initially, Mountbatten asked each to send him a draft. Nehru wrote to reject the 
involvement of the UNO, agreed to the principle of continuous majority Muslim and non-Muslim areas, and as a 
concession to the Sikhs, stipulated that it should ‘take into account other factors’ (Mansergh and Moon 1982, 
239). At the Viceroy’s Executive Council meeting held on 13th June 1947 to confirm the terms of reference, 
Baldev Singh did not speak (Ibid., 382). 
iii A simple search on Google of ‘Sikh pilgrimage tours to Pakistan’ generates a large number of sites based in 
Pakistan. Sikh Tourism, for example, claims ‘Today’s Pakistan is the cradle of the Sikh religion. We proudly 
claim that Guru Nanak Dev Ji was born in this part of the subcontinent, spent most of his time here…and have 
more than ninety per cent of the Sikh shrines in Pakistan.’ See http://www.sikhtourism.com.pk/index.php. 
Accessed 20 February 2019. 
iv For a discussion of the concept of sovereignty within the Sikh tradition, see Mandair (2015). 
